Euro or not Euro - that is not the question! Economic well-being and the fate of the European Monetary Union by Heise, Arne
www.ssoar.info
Euro or not Euro - that is not the question!
Economic well-being and the fate of the European
Monetary Union
Heise, Arne
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Heise, A. (2014). Euro or not Euro - that is not the question! Economic well-being and the fate of the European
Monetary Union. (ZÖSS Discussion Paper, 43). Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, Fak. Wirtschafts- und
Sozialwissenschaften, FB Sozialökonomie, Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien (ZÖSS). https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59859-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Arne Heise 
 
Euro or not Euro –  
that is not the question! 
Economic well-being and  
the fate of the  
European Monetary Union 
 
 
 
ZÖSS 
ZENTRUM FÜR ÖKONOMISCHE 
UND SOZIOLOGISCHE STUDIEN 
 
Discussion Papers 
ISSN 1868-4947/43 
Discussion Papers 
Hamburg 2014 
 

  
 
 
 
Euro or not Euro – that is 
not the question! 
Economic well-being and the fate of 
the European Monetary Union 
 
 
 
 
Arne Heise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 
ISSN 1868-4947/43 
Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien 
Universität Hamburg 
Juni 2014 
  
Impressum: 
 
 
Die Discussion Papers werden vom Zentrum für Ökonomische und 
Soziologische Studien veröffentlicht. Sie umfassen Beiträge von am 
Fachbereich Sozialökonomie Lehrenden, Nachwuchswissenschaft-
lerInnen sowie Gast-ReferentInnen zu transdisziplinären 
Fragestellungen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Herausgeber/Redaktion: 
 
 
 
Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien (ZÖSS) 
Kathrin.Deumelandt@wiso.uni-hamburg.de 
Fachbereich Sozialökonomie 
Universität Hamburg – Fakultät WISO 
Welckerstr. 8 
D – 20354 Hamburg 
Download der vollständigen Discussion Papers:  
http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche/sozialoekonomie/ 
forschung/zoess/publikationen/discussion-papers/ 
Heise: Euro or not Euro – that is not the question! 
 
1 
 
Abstract 
 
It will be argued that it is not of fundamental importance for growth and employment 
whether the EU clings to the Euro or allows for a dissolution of the Eurozone and a 
reemergence of national currencies but how multi-level macroeconomic coordination of 
different policy areas and nation-states will be achieved. Given that this insight is based 
on an alternative economic reasoning which is (still) not the common view of most 
political and economic actors relevant in the EU, it will be analysed under which 
conditions it would be recommendable to maintain the Euro or to reestablish national 
currencies.” 
 
Key words: European integration, neo-functionalism, neo-realism 
JEL codes: F15, P16 
 
 
 
1. Introduction* 
 
The European Union (EU) has seen many crisis during its six decades of existence – it 
has been argued that these situations of crisis were, ex post,  movers of further 
integration from what started as a sectoral customs union and proceeded towards a 
monetary union at the core of European integration (see Schmitter 2012: 39). And 
although these historical developments, which have been celebrated as great success 
after the first decade of monetary unification by, at least, the officials of the EU1, have 
been the contested outcome of intergovernmental negotiations against the backcloth of 
national interests or, more precisely, of dominant national interest groups, those 
theoreticians appeared to be right who argued that the spill-over of functional 
necessities from one economic sector or political arena to another will, in the long run, 
direct the course of European ever deepening integration. Thus, the neo-functionalists 
appeared to have the upper hand over the neo-realists2 or, at least, that both approaches 
                                                 
*
 This paper has been presented at the International Research Workshop ‘Full Employment in Europe: 
With or Without the Euro? held between 15th and 16th of May 2014 at the University of Grenoble, 
France.   
1
 Joaquim Almunia, then EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, stated: “A full decade 
after Europe's leaders took the decision to launch the euro, we have good reason to be proud of our 
single currency. The Economic and Monetary Union and the euro are a major success. For its member 
countries, EMU has anchored macroeconomic stability and increased cross border trade, financial 
integration and investment. For the EU as a whole, the euro is a keystone of further economic 
integration and a potent symbol of our growing political unity” (Almunia 2008). From a less biased 
perspective, the conclusions after 10 years were slightly more skeptical, yet not entirely pessimistic; see 
Matthes (2009).   
2
 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a high ranked official of the Italian Central Bank and, as a member of the 
Delor ‘Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union’,one of the architects of EMU, 
argues very much in the spirit of the neo-functionalist interpretation: “(T)he road toward the single 
currency looks like a chain reaction in which each step resolved a preexisting contradiction and 
generated a new one that in turn required a further step foward” (Padoa-Schioppa 2004: 14).   
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may well be complementary rather than rivalry in explaining the fate of European 
integration3.  
 
The recent Euro Crisis puts all that into question again: firstly, a dissolution of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) has never been discussed as widely, openly and 
earnestly before (see e.g. Tsoukalis 2012:48ff.). Secondly, even a reversion of direction 
from further integration to an escalating disintegration is not ruled out any more (e.g. 
Krastev 2012a; Eppler/Scheller 2014) and, thirdly, the potentials of functional spill-
overs (i.e. systems rationality) appear ultimately to be restricted and dominated by the 
logic of Zweckrationalität (utilitarian rationality).  
 
In the following, two questions will be addressed: Under what conditions will a neo-
functionalist and, respectively, a neo-realist path shape the future of the EU in general 
and the Eurozone in particular assuming that neo-functionalists would take the Euro as 
catalyst for further integration4 and neo-realists as the seed of dissolution, if not 
disintegration5. Additionally, we will inquire whether it is the existence or absence of a 
common currency in the EU which is at the root of economic resilience and well-being 
as the legitimizing basis for European integration in the first place. 
 
 
2. One market, one money – a common currency for Europe? 
 
Interestingly, the demands for a Eurozone split-up on the one hand and a Eurozone 
safeguarding on the other cannot be channelled into a right-left political or mainstream-
heterodox economical divide. There are those lefitish social scientists such as Wolfgang 
Streeck (2012; 2013; 2014), Fritz W. Scharpf (2014), Alberto Bagnai (2012) and Costas 
Lapavitsas6 and political movements such as Zyrica in Greece and influential parts of 
the Linke party in Germany7 who favour a return to exchange rate adjustments between 
structurally different countries in the EU as the best option to cope with the failure of a 
‘frivolous experiment’ (Streeck 2013). They argue that EMU has turned the EU into a 
                                                 
3
 Both theories emerged from political science of international relations and are arguably the most 
important theories of European integration, yet rarely consulted by economists. One interesting 
exception is Spolaore (2013).   
4
 For course, neo-functionalism does not predict a smooth, unidirectional path towards ever deepening integration. 
Particularly after a long stagnative period with respect to European integration during the 1960s, neo-functionalists 
developed the concept of ‚spill-back‘ referring “to a situation in which there is a withdrawal from a set of specific 
obligations. Rules are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. The scope of Community action and its institutional 
capacities decrease“ (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970: 137). However, ‚spill-back‘ may account for temporary 
stagnation and stand-still but not for a reverse of the direction of integration (see Haas 1967: 316).    
5
 Dissolution merely implies the undoing of the existing European Monetary Union in any possible way: the exit of 
one or more member states, the split into two or more EMU’s (e.g. North-Euro or South-Euro) or the complete 
return to national currencies. Disintegration means the full-scale split-up of EMU into its former national 
currencies and further measures reversing real economic integration. For an account of the likelihood of 
disintegration according to the theories of (European) integration see Webber (2011).   
6
 Costa Lapavitsas signed a European Solidarity Manifesto (2013) which favours a ‘controlled segmentation of the 
Eurozone’. 
7
 Oskar Lafontaine, former chairperson of the Social Democratic Party and Finance Minister of Germany in the first 
Schröder administration (1998 – 1999) and, then, long-time chairperson of the newly founded Linke party, argues 
for a return to the European Monetary System (EMS) as alternative to EMU; Lafontaine (2013).   
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system of competing states triggering a race to the bottom in most social categories such 
as real wages (for, at least, the wage earners at medium income and below), social 
standards, working conditions, etc. and only a return to national currencies would 
alleviate the competitive pressure. Conservative-mainstream social scientists such as 
Hans Werner Sinn (2012), Jacques Sapir (2012) and Francois Heisbourg (2013) also 
argue for a split-up of the Eurozone as they are afraid that otherwise the principles of 
price and fiscal stability – national myths for the Germans and for many neo- and ordo-
liberals elsewhere – will go down the drain. Conservative political parties such as the 
‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) or the ‘Front National’ (FN) share this anxiety and 
play with the popular fear of inflation, public debts and xenophobia in relation to further 
European integration. However, other mainstream social scientists such as Jesus Huerta 
de Soto (2012), Marcel Fratzscher and Clemens Fuest8 and, still, most centrists political 
parties in the EU defend the Eurozone as best possible way to achieve growth, 
employment and well-being in the EU. They put emphasis on the idea that the Euro is 
an institutional arrangement which helps to contain ‘governmental failure’. On the other 
hand, heterodox social scientists such as Michel Aglietta9 , Philip Arestis and Malcolm 
Sawyer (2013) and most centre-left parties also favour a defence of the Eurozone as the 
best foundation for a revival of macroeconomic intervention policies in times of 
globalisation. 
 
What to make of this seemingly curious texture of pro- and contra-Euro positions which 
lie across common ideological and paradigmatical fault lines? Summarized in simplified 
terms, the Euro is opposed because it acts as catalyst for neoliberal type policies and 
objectives and, because it does not do so10. Moreover, the Euro is defended because it 
may provide room for interventionist manoeuvres and, because it may help preventing 
them11 – these puzzling findings hint at the core of the argument to be unfolded in the 
next section: it’s not the Euro as common currency but rather the governance system in 
which a common currency is embedded that really matters. 
 
But let us first remind ourselves that today’s landscape of pros and contras of Euro’s 
continuation mirrors the pro-con landscape of Euro’s establishment in the 1980s and 
1990s: The EU Commission’s report ‘One market, one money’ laid the groundwork for 
latter discussions (see European Commission 1990). The EU Commission (EC) 
expected more gains from a reduction of transaction and uncertainty costs, the 
harvesting of economies of scale due to a deepening of market integration and a better 
allocation of factors of production within the monetary union than potential losses 
particularly stemming from adjustment problems in case of asymmetric exogenous 
                                                 
8
 Marcel Fratzscher and Clemens Fuest are part of a group of German social scientists called ‘Glienicker Gruppe’ 
who published a pro-Euro manifesto: Glienecker Gruppe (2013). 
9
 Michel Aglietta signed a Manifesto Promoting Solidarity and Integration within the Eurozone (2011) which favours 
a new architecture for the Eurozone. 
10
 These opposing evaluations may be a case of ‚cognitive dissonance‘ as well as a question of judgement: While any 
competitive pressure impeding national policy-making can be seen as limitation to the provision of democratically 
legitimized public goods, any restriction on pure systems competition can be judged as invitation for societal 
groups to pursue their vested interests. 
11
 Here, of course, the different paradigmatical foundations are responsible for the contradictory evaluations.  
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shocks hitting the monetary union which, undeniably, was no ‘optimal currency area’12. 
Underlying assumptions were those of mainstream ‘natural rate economics’ namely that 
the flexibility of exchange rates cannot help with ‘real’ structural problems but would 
only allow to choose different national ‘nominal’ price levels (or inflations rates)13 and 
that public finances would need to remain in national responsibility (no-bail-out) and 
need to be restricted (balanced budget).           
 
Although the general line of argument of the EC’s report had been accepted by most 
economists, yet the cost component drew some discussion: critical mainstream 
economists held that EMU being no Optimum Currency Area (OCA) would evoke large 
adjustment costs in case of asymmetric exogenous shocks due to low factor mobility, 
inflexible labour markets and centralized collective bargaining systems in the Eurozone. 
They feared that national interest groups were strong enough to fend off those 
institutional reforms necessary to make EMU working – thus creating huge costs 
outweighing the benefits of EMU. Mainstream defenders of EMU would not deny such 
short-run costs but would argue that EMU is the necessary institutional vice to 
eventually get such supply-side reforms which the national political economy will 
prevent14. Heterodox critics pointed to the fact that EMU certainly was no ‘Optimal 
Wage Area’15 and, thereby, raising questions about the sustainability of internal 
imbalances. Heterodox defenders argued that a Keynesian architecture of interventionist 
macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies cannot be provided by small open 
economies in a globalised world but need a common currency to create a bigger, more 
closed economy where coordinated fiscal, monetary and wage policies could in 
principle be envisaged.       
 
 
3. Neo-realism versus neo-functionalism or: what kind of rationality will prevail? 
 
As it stands, former critics of EMU are today’s gravediggers: the mainstream critics 
take the recent World Financial Crisis as the asymmetric exogenous shock that splits the 
Eurozone into those countries that have done their homework in the past in terms of 
fiscal consolidation and supply-side reforms and those, that have not. Moreover, as in 
many cases in the past, national political economics prevent the necessary from being 
implemented and, instead, the acceptance of economic follies such as the undermining 
of the ‘No-bail-out clause’ by establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
and allowing the European Central Bank (ECB) to indirectly finance governments via 
                                                 
12
 For a contemporary review of the report see Artis (1991) and for a backward looking review see Spahn (2013). The 
theory of an optimum currency area was pioneered by Robert Mundell (1961) and extended by Ronald McKinnon 
(1963), Peter Kenen (1969) and many others. 
13
 And there would be no reason for the insistence on different national price levels, however a common culture of 
price stability would rule out irrational factors. 
14
 In the literature on the history of European integration, the two opposing views are typically dubbed as 
‘monetarists’ and ‘economists’ with most official German (mainstream) economists adhering to the ‘economist’ 
position and most official French (mainstream) economists adhering to the ‘monetarist’ position. 
15
 The theory of ‚Optimum Wage Areas‘ describes the preconditions for a currency union to be able to cope with 
problems stemming from heterogenous collective bargaining systems within its confines (see Heise 2000).    
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open market operations. In order to prevent further such atrocities from happening, they 
openly advertise the return to national currencies and, in some cases, even further 
disintegrative steps to cure former supra-nationalist wrongdoing (such as much of 
product regulations by the EC). The heterodox critics take the entire history of EMU in 
general and, as under a magnifier, the World Financial and Euro Crisis and the ensuing 
austerity measures implemented under EU control as evidence of their claim that a 
monetary union intensifies the process of commodification and neo-liberalization and 
turns social economies into market societies. Therefore, they rely on and hope for the 
working of national social democracies16 which will result in a Eurozone breakdown 
when EMU-related costs become prohibitive. However, they hasten to add that a 
Eurozone fragmentation does not and should not involve a further disintegration of the 
European Union as a successful project of regional economic and political integration.    
 
The mainstream defenders of the Eurozone (e.g. European Commission 2009) take the 
common currency as rampart against the real effects of the World Financial Crisis 
which only proved the need for some further fortifications in terms of emergency 
measures (such as the ESM) and the hardening of existing rules and regulations (such as 
the European Fiscal Compact strengthening the European Stability and Growth Pact)17. 
Safeguarding the Eurozone today is, according to this position, an investment in 
building a better working system of competing states tomorrow that guarantees fewer 
options for rent seeking at the national level. Finally, heterodox supporter of the 
Eurozone interpret the Euro Crisis basically as the emergence of unsustainable internal 
(regional) imbalances which have been treated with the wrong medicine of austerity 
programmes aggravating instead of alleviating the problems. However, this treatment is 
not a join-product of a monetary union per se, they argue, but the unavoidable result of 
an architecture of the European Monetary Union which is entirely based on the premises 
of ‘After Keynesian Macroeconomics’18: Leaving stabilisation policy to price stability 
oriented central banks and the working of the automatic stabilizers in a framework of 
balanced public budgets19 and leaving market clearing to deregulated product and factor 
markets. Or, to put it differently: a more Keynesian-type policy, coordinating a growth 
oriented fiscal, monetary and wage policy game (see Pusch/Heise 2010; Pusch 2009), is 
still feasible only at the supranational level but needs a completely different economic 
governance structure. 
 
                                                 
16
 Rieger/Leibfried (1998) argue that the process of globalization (and European integration is part of that process) 
has been made politically viable only by the extension of national welfare states compensating potential losers of 
globalization – this is, what they call the result of ‘social democracies’. 
17
 For a critical assessment of the European Fiscal Compact see Creel/Hubert/Saraceno (2012). 
18
 This expression has been coined by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent (1979) to label the mainstream economic 
paradigm that emerged after the so called ‘Keynesian Revolution’.  
19
 Heise (2012) explains why the existing European Economic Governance System must be rated as a straightjacket 
impairing economic growth and undermining fiscal consolidation.    
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Table 1: Positions towards EMU 
General line of 
argument 
 
End EMU 
 
 
Progress EMU 
Paradigmatic 
orientation 
 
Left-heterodox 
 
 
Right-
mainstream 
 
Left-heterodox 
 
Right-
mainstream 
General 
position 
towards 
monetary union 
Monetary union 
can be seen as 
uncertainty-
reducing 
institution 
Monetary union 
can be seen as 
transaction cost 
reducing 
institution  
Monetary union 
can be seen as 
uncertainty-
reducing 
institution 
Monetary union 
can be seen as 
transaction cost 
reducing 
institution 
Position 
towards 
European 
Monetary 
Union 
EMU is neither 
an Optimal 
Currency Area 
(OCA) nor an 
Optimal Wage 
Area (OWA)  
EMU is no 
OCA 
EMU is neither 
OCA nor OWA 
EMU is no 
OCA 
Basic problem 
in EMU’s 
operation 
EMU turned out 
to be a neoliberal 
project to impose 
market 
deregulation and  
liberalisation and 
social 
retrenchment 
EMU creates 
regional 
imbalances (no 
OCA) which 
undermines 
stability 
orientation in 
fiscal and 
monetary 
policies (OMT 
of ECB, ESM, 
etc.)  
EMU’s policy 
coordination 
institutions 
(ESGp, EMD, 
EPS) are 
contradictory and 
do not match the 
necessary 
congruency of 
needs and ability 
EMU’s policy 
coordination 
institutions 
(ESGP, BEPG, 
EPS) not strict 
enough to 
impose 
‘dynamic OCA’   
Proposed 
solution 
Disintegration of 
EMU in order to 
regain national 
policy options 
(wage policy, 
exchange rate 
policy) 
No further 
disintegration of 
EU  
Disintegration 
of EMU in order 
to re-establish 
national 
responsibilities 
(monetary and 
fiscal policies) 
Possibly further 
disintegration of 
EU (national 
regulation, etc.) 
Further 
integration 
towards political 
and fiscal union 
based on an 
alternative 
integration path: 
Establishment of 
a European 
Keynesian 
Welfare State 
(EKWS) 
Further 
integration 
towards a 
stability culture 
union based on 
the same 
neoliberal 
integration path 
as before: 
Establishment of 
a system of 
European 
Competition 
States (ECS)  
Integration 
theoretical 
paradigm 
 
Neo-realism based on 
Zweckrationalität derived from 
national interests 
 
Neo-functionalism based on 
Systemrationalität  
Note: ESPG = European Stability and Growth Pact, EMD = European Macroeconomic 
Dialogue; EPS = Employment Policy Strategy; BEPG = Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines 
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As we can see now, what separates the gravediggers from the defenders is not their 
paradigmatic orientation, but rather their belief in Zweck- or Systemrationalität 
(utilitarian or systems rationality) respectively as prime mover of European integration 
(see tab. 1). Those, who view national interest groups at centre-stage of policy-making 
in general and European integration-shaping in particular, i.e. those who prefer a neo-
realist perspective, plead for dissolution – albeit for entirely different, almost opposing 
reasons. And those, who maintain that – under the surface of intergovernmental 
negotiations – the constraints of functionality matter most in the long run of history-
shaping, i.e. those of neo-functionalist orientation, regard the safeguarding of the Euro 
as necessary device for further spill-overs that, as we have argued, can go entirely 
different directions depending on the underlying paradigm. This, however, gives us a 
decent control mechanism: Whilst in case of a Euroland breakdown, we would be never 
sure about the reasons – non-functionality or political economy –, in case of a Euroland 
survival, the reason must be systems functionality of the measures taken.    
      
 
4. Neo-functionalist preconditions for a survival of the Eurozone   
 
It should be clear by now that the basic question to be answered is not whether the Euro 
should be defended or abandonded but rather whether national political economics or 
functional obligations rule the roost at the end of the day. One is readily inclined to 
believe that interests matter more than functions particularly when it comes to objects of 
‘high politics’ rather than ‘low politics’ of more technocratic character20. Under such a 
belief, a dissolution of the Eurozone would be the more likely scenario and, irrespective 
of the paradigmatical basis, recommendable from a normative point of view. But from 
this perspective, it would have been difficult to explain the establishment of the 
European Monetary Union in the first place21 and the consistent formation of national 
(economic) preferences has always been the ‘Archilles’ heel’ of neo-realism (see e.g. 
Forster 1998). This does not mean that functional necessities easily overrule vested 
interests but a neo-functionalist orientation, at least, allows for the formulation of 
preconditions for a long-term survival of the Eurozone: The basic assumption of neo-
functionalism is that developments are seen as irreversible! To prevent this from being 
circular reasoning, irreversibility must be attached to the conceived fulfilment of 
objectives that are linked with the functional devices in question – in our case, the prime 
objective of EMU was and still is, apart from purely political and cultural ideas, to 
contribute to further prosperity and, particularly, employment growth in the member 
states of the Eurozone22.  
 
                                                 
20
 For the distinction between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’ see Keohane/Nye (1977). 
21
 It has been argued that German unification was crucial for overcoming the ‚neo-realist‘ trap of national egoism (see 
Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 751) and, therefore, European monetary unification quite a ‘historical accident’. 
22
 Barry Eichengreen (2010) argues that “(t)he decision to join the euro area is effectively irreversible.” Yet, he does 
not argue possitively in terms of fulfilment of objectives but negatively with economic and political costs and 
procedural impossibilities of a dissolution. Although, such considerations certainly play a role, I do not believe 
that the fate of the Eurozone can be based on uncertain costs alone but must be rooted in a loyality of the 
European mass public and in a satisfaction with the output of the Eurozone (see Vollard 2008: 7).     
Heise: Euro or not Euro – that is not the question! 
 
8 
 
Now, this is exactly the inherent argument of the defenders of EMU: Irrespective of 
their paradigmatical basis, they see monetary union as a necessary, though not 
sufficient, device for dealing with economic problems that cannot accurately be handled 
at the national level. However, it is crucial in this respect that EMU is no sufficient 
device – what matters most is the governance structure into which the Eurozone is 
embedded. And, of course, that is where the defenders of EMU of different 
paradigmatical orientations part company: While the mainstream defenders cast a 
restrictive institutional structure to cope with expected (or, rather, assumed) moral 
hazard and rent-seeking behaviour of national political and collective actors, the 
heterodox defenders design a governance structure which allows for and increases the 
likelihood of coordination among fiscal, monetary and wage policies in order to create a 
macroeconomic market constellation or regime which combines fiscal sustainability and 
price stability with economic and employment growth and a progressive social security 
system (see e.g. Arestis/Sawyer 2006; Schulmeister 2014). Whether this can be 
achieved within the cooperative approach of the so called European Macroeconomic 
Dialogue (EMD) once set up by a Social Democratic majority of governments in the EU 
members states in the late 1990s or whether it needs some kind of supranational 
‘Gouvernement Economique’ depends on the feasibility of a multi-level governance 
systems. Experiences with such types of ‘governance without government’ are not 
promising as historical lessons appear to predict that monetary unions without fiscal and 
political unions ultimately fail (see Theurl 1992). On the other hand, a further step 
towards fiscal and political union appears unlikely in a fragmentised political arena such 
as the European Union where, at least at the very moment, Europessimism is on the 
sharp rise again (see e.g. Usherwood/Startin 2013; Serricchio/Tsakatika/Quaglia 2013). 
Moreover, historical lessons tell us that fiscal and political union have only prevailed as 
a direct consequence of wars (Langewiesche 2013). But, maybe the project of European 
integration proves to be unique on any of these accounts. 
 
It is not the Euro itself, i.e. a common currency, which is important to cope with 
economic problems such as financial and real crisis and, more important in normal 
times, with unemployment and stagnation, but the economic governance system in 
which a common currency is embedded. Unsurprisingly, the architecture of such a 
governance system is embattled – with the better end for the mainstream economists of 
‘After Keynesian Macroeconomics’ in the past 2 to 3 decades23. However, what follows 
may be what has been dubbed as the ‘revenge of neo-functionalism’ (see Cooper 2011) 
once we assume a heterodox position24: In that case, we are faced with an 
‘inconsistency triangle’ in the Eurozone (see fig. 1): Maintaining the Euro (in the long 
run) and, as a functionalist precondition for this objective, reviving and maintaining 
                                                 
23
 According to McNamara (1998) the neoliberal consensus of the past decades made the process of integration, 
particularly monetary integration, possible. It seems obvious that a common perspective – or: the absence of 
cognitive dissonance – on economic policy issues increases the likelihood of an integration process that is based 
on extended cooperation and agreement. However, a potential ‘Keynesian consensus’ could have worked as well.  
24
 This assumption can be substantiated on the grounds of mainstream economics having come under severe pressure 
in the course of the World Financial Crisis with respect to its explanatory power (see e.g. Caballero 2010; 
Galbraith 2013; Kirman 2010; Krugman 2009; Stiglitz 2009). 
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economic growth for prosperity and full employment cannot be achieved on the basis of 
a neoliberal policy regime.  
 
Or put differently, if neoliberal economic policies will further be pursued and even, as 
under the reformed economic governance structure of the Eurozone as it exists in the 
moment, hardened, prosperity and full employment will be unattainable and, therefore, 
the Euro will not be sustainable. Or, to put it again differently: if the defence of the Euro 
is a political goal of overarching importance for policy actors (and the elite which 
dominates the public discourse and opinion, at least, under normal circumstances25) all 
over Europe26, and economic well-being and full employment are crucial for the mass 
support of the Euro, neoliberal economic policies will no longer do the job.             
 
Figure 1: Inconsistency triangle 
 
 
 
 
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Of course, it appears hard to believe in a breakdown of neoliberal policy-making after 
this ideological doctrine proved its resilience27 after the World Financial Crisis when 
some commentators already expected its final decline (see e.g. Comaroff 2011; Crouch 
2012; Harvey 2009; Mirowski 2013) – the latest announcements about France’s re-
orientation towards a German-style supply-side economic policy undermine the 
expectation that corrections may come from a group of countries led by France (see 
Evans-Pritchard 2014; Artus 2014). Yet, there are also signs of hope: Firstly, within the 
European Commission a discussion about a ‘Genuine Monetary Union’ (GMU) 
                                                 
25
 For the influence of elite (or meritocratic) interests on economic outcomes see Heise (2008); for a constructivist 
model of political economics describing the transmission channels of elite influence see Heise (2005). 
26
 According to Webber (2011) and Krastev (2012b) it is particularly Germany as a ‚semi-hegemon‘ whose support is 
crucial. 
27
 Colin Crouch (2011: 179) asks: „(W)hat remains of neoliberalism after the financial crisis, the answer must be 
‚virtually everything‘. The combination of economic and political forces behind this agenda is too powerful for it 
to be fundamentally dislodged from its predominance.” 
Neoliberal economic policy 
Prosperity and  
full employment 
Common 
currency 
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including institutional arrangements that can be interpreted as steps towards a fiscal and 
political union has been launched (see European Commission 2012)28 marking a notable 
turnaround in the positioning of the EU Commission – which is, of course, an important 
policy-actor at EU level. Moreover, secondly, in the past we have seen several marked 
policy-shifts that were contrary to the dominant ideology of the time and the declared 
policy regime: Despite the fact that no one would associate Thatcherism with 
macroeconomic policy-management of Keynesian style, during the second half of the 
1980s, we have seen exactly this kind of ‘stealth’ or under-cover regime change by the 
Thatcher-Lawson government in order to deal with the twin problems of growing 
unemployment and growing income inequality29. Moreover, the Reagan administration 
in the US combined the image of tough supply-siders with the reality of a fiscal policy 
which has been dubbed ‘military Keynesianism’30. And even the behaviour of most 
Eurozone governments during the World Financial and ensuing Euro Crisis, when they 
put stabilization and bank rescue packages in place which run contrary to their 
economic ideologies and allowed for measures such as the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) programmes by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
issuance of collectively guaranteed bonds by the ESM31, prove the point in question, 
although, admittedly these measures were designed as emergency measures only not yet 
indicating a thorough policy-shift32.            
 
 
5. Some concluding remarks 
 
Although the recent World Financial and Euro Crisis are not yet entirely resolved, it is 
more likely now than two years ago that the Eurozone will survive its repercussions. 
However, the earnestness of the discussion about its fate has made clear that the Euro is 
not only a symbol of the willingness of the Europeans to unite and to defend the 
achievements of the past but may be interpreted as the anxiety of the Europeans that a 
politically inspired project of the war-stricken 20th century is running economically 
amok in a world of lasting differences. 
 
Whether the Euro will or shall survive the next economic crisis not only depends on the 
tenaciousness of their defenders but also, and that may be good news for those who 
advocate a ‘Genuine Monetary Union’ including steps towards a veritable fiscal and 
political union, the acceptance of the elite to cope with a new type of supranational 
Keynesian intervention state. If this acceptance cannot be established or populist 
                                                 
28
 It must be admitted that Germany succeeded in watering much of these ideas down to what appeared acceptable 
with the conservative German elites at the time: decision-making remains fixed to intergovernmental instead of 
supranational bodies and a fiscal union is spelled out without collective obligations such as a supranational budget 
or, leastwise, Euro bonds. For an account of Germany’s policy-making at EU level see Gammelin/Löw (2014).  
29
 This has been documented by several authors; see Britton (1993), Maynard (1993), Wells (1993). 
30
 See e.g. Paterson (1988); Navarro (1988: 230ff.). 
31
 On a rhetorical level, the German government is the strongest opponent of Eurobonds, on a pragmatical level, 
Germany accepted the establishment of the ESM issuing a functional equivalent of Eurobonds.  
32
 For an attempt to interpret the ECB’s monetary policy measures during the Euro Crisis in neo-functionalist terms 
see Ehrhart (2013). 
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reasoning and activity prevails33, the Euro experiment will eventually fail leaving not 
only all the questions of a guided dissolution open but also the questions of a national 
approach to crisis resolution and economic well-being beyond long-term stagnation and 
unemployment.      
                                                 
33
 It is rather easy to identify a number of members of the Eurozone where populist movements may become 
influential political powers in the near future. Moreover, political processes which will eventually cause a break-
up of the European Monetary Union may well be triggered from Non-Eurozone members such as the UK where 
even the exit from the European Union is a realistic option, see Mansfield (2014); Springford/Tilford (2014). 
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